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sion, the court relied upon its analysis in
Quinlin v. Mid Century Ins., 741 P.2d
822 (1987), and the state legislature's
use of "offer" in other insurance statutes. It concluded that "offer" was used
to instruct insurance companies simply
to make a certain type of coverage available to purchasers. Nevertheless, the
court stated that in order to effectuate
the legislature's intent, the insurers must
notify their customers that greater UM
coverage is available. The Quinlincourt
held that the following statement included in the insurer's renewal notice
satisfied the statutory notification requirements: "Did you know that you
may now have uninsured motorist coverage in amounts up to your bodily
injury liability limits? If interested contact your agent." In examining the notification in the case at bar, the supreme
court held that USAA made a much
fuller disclosure of the UM coverage
available to insureds, and thus met the
notice requirement under the statute.
The court concluded, however, that
the 1990 amendment to the applicable
state law rendered Quinlin'snotice standard inapplicable to insurance transactions that occurred after the effective
date of the statute. The legislative history behind the amendment indicated
that it was specifically intended to impose prospectively a greater duty of
notice upon insurers.
Court refuses to impose retroactively
a broader standard of disclosure
Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme
Court rejected Breithaupt's argument
that Quinlin should be overruled and a
broader duty of disclosure retroactively
imposed. It concluded that the legislative history behind the applicable state
law indicated the legislature's intent
was to impose a greater duty of disclosure upon insurers only to insurance
transactions made after the effective
date of the statute.
The court examined the committee
meetings and legislative history behind
the 1990 amendment to NRS
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687B. 145(2). In doing so, it concluded
that the legislature had not considered
the statute as imposing a duty of notice
greater than announced in Quinlin. The
court failed to identify any legislative
evidence that Quinlin contravened the
intent of the 1979 legislature in enacting NRS 687B. 145(2). Furthermore, it
reasoned that even if Quinlin had been
wrongly decided, it was not necessary
to impose retroactively a greater burden
upon insurers. In making this determination, the court articulated three factors limiting the law to prospective application. These included: (1) the decision must dictate a new legal principle
which either overrules past precedent
on which parties may have relied or is
an issue of first impression, the outcome
of which was not clearly foreshadowed;
(2) the court must evaluate the merits in
each case by examining the prior history, purpose, and effect of the rule
under analysis and whether or not retrospective operation will aid its implementation; and (3) the court must consider whether retroactive application
could cause substantial inequitable results. The supreme court concluded that
the retroactive application of NRS
687B.145(2) would not improve pre1990 consumer awareness of the benefits of purchasing the optional UM
coverage. Accordingly, it affirmed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment for the insurer, USAA.
-Benjamin Malkin

Strict liability
extended to
commercial leases
In Samuel FriedlandFamily Enterprises v.Amoroso, 630 So.2d 1067 (Fla.
1994), the Florida Supreme Court held
that the doctrine of strict liability extends to commercial lease transactions
of defective products.

The Amorosos hit rough seas
The Diplomat Hotel (Diplomat), a
waterfront property in Hollywood,
Florida, leased part of its land to Sunrise
Water Sports, Inc. (Sunrise) which used
the land to operate a sailboat rental
stand. Sunrise owned the sailboats, but
Atlantic Sailing Center, Inc. (Atlantic),
rented them out. The Amorosos were
guests at the Diplomat and rented sailboats on three separate occasions. During the third rental, the crossbar on the
Amorosos' rented sailboat broke and
Mrs. Amoroso was injured. As a result
of her injuries, Amoroso and her husband sued the Diplomat, Sunrise, Atlantic, and the welder who had repaired
the crossbar a few days before the accident. One of the Amorosos' claims asserted that the Diplomat, Sunrise, and
Atlantic were strictly liable for Mrs.
Amoroso's injuries.
The trial court directed verdicts in
favor of all the defendants on the strict
liability claim. The district court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding
that strict liability extends to commercial lease transactions. The appellate
court certified the question of whether
the doctrine of strict liability extends to
commercial lease transactions for appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.
Lessors in the leasing business held
to strictliability
The Florida Supreme Court initially
analyzed the purpose of strict liability.
The court stated that the doctrine of
strict liability causes the entities within
the distributive chain who profit from
the product's sale or distribution to bear
the burden of product defects, even undetectable ones. As compared with an
innocent injured person, those entities
are in a better position to ensure the
safety of products, protect against defects in those products, and spread the
cost of any resulting injuries. The Florida
Supreme Court had previously adopted
the strict liability doctrine in West v.
CaterpillarTractorCo, 336 So.2d 80,
87 (Fla. 1976), and recognized that "a
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manufacturer who places a potentially
dangerous product on the market and
encourages its use undertakes a special
responsibility toward members of the
public who may be injured by its use."
Since West, courts have expanded
the doctrine of strict liability to include
not only manufacturers, but also retailers, wholesalers, and distributors. In
addition to the district court of appeals
in the case at bar, several other circuits,
as well as courts of various states, have
extended strict liability to commercial
lessors for defective products they
leased.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for
example, held a truck rental company
strictly liable for injuries resulting from
a defective truck it leased. The court
based its decision to extend strict liability to lessors on the similarities between
sales and lease transactions. The court
suggested that the rationale for imposing strict liability may be even greater in
leasing arrangements than for sales because a lessee usually has less opportunity than a purchaser to inspect a product, and the risk of injury is greater in
commercial leasing due to the product's
repeated entry into the stream of commerce.
Likewise, the California Supreme
Court also held commercial lessors
strictly liable. The court reasoned that
the purpose of imposing strict liability
is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers who put
these products into the market rather
than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves. The
court concluded that the only difference
between sales and lease transactions is
which party retains title to the product.
Because the legal form of title does not
affect the risk of harm or the burden of
cost, lessors and sellers should be subject to the same liability.
The California Supreme Court limited its holding to lessors in the business
of leasing, just as strict liability claims
are limited to sellers in the business of
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manufacturing or retailing. This restriction is consistent with the policy of
spreading the cost of injuries because
only those "in the business," those who
regularly engage in such transactions,
are able to adjust prices for the costs
associated with strict liability. Accordingly, a person who only leases or sells
an item in an isolated transaction is not
able to adjust its price for the cost associated with strict liability and should
not have to bear that burden.
The court is immune to the
Diplomat's arguments
In the case at bar, the Diplomat argued that the district court should not
have held it strictly liable for leasing a
defective product. The hotel first contended that the district court's application of strict liability was unfair because
it was overly broad. It urged the Florida
Supreme Court to limit its holding to
only those lessors who were "mass dealers in chattel." The Diplomat asserted
that the district court's holding would
cause a drastic increase in potential liability, which small businesses could
not endure. The Florida Supreme Court
quickly disposed of this argument,
finding no authority or reason to differentiate between a business which is
considered a mass dealer in a product
and one which is not, provided both are
actually in the business of leasing the
defective product.
The Diplomat next contended that
lessors should be treated as sellers of
used goods who are strictly liable only
for manufacturing and design defects,
but not for defects arising after a product has left the manufacturer and the
original seller. This argument was also
unpersuasive. The supreme court explained that the policies underlying strict
liability require lessors and sellers of
used goods to be treated differently because of the distinctions in the role and
functions of each. Sellers of used goods
should not bear the risk where they
neither created it nor assumed it and are
not in a position to implement proce-

dures to avoid the distribution of defective products. Defects in a used product
generally arise before the product
reaches the seller and while the product
is in the hands of an unknown previous
owner. The seller is unaware of the prior
history of products, and can only discover and correct latent defects at a
great cost. Further, participants in the
used goods market understand that no
assurances as to quality exist. These
distinct qualities are the reason sellers
of used goods are subject only to a
limited application of strict liability.
Used product sellers differ from commercial lessors in that the commercial
lessor knows the prior history of a product and is easily able to discover and
repair any defects through routine inspections. Furthermore, lessees view
the lessor's act of placing the product on
the market as an implied guarantee of
the product's fitness and as an assumption of the risk by the lessor. These
important differences between sellers
of used goods and lessors demand a
broader application of strict liability to
lessors in the business of leasing in
order to serve the underlying policies of
the doctrine of strict liability.
Courtfinds the Diplomat strictly
liable for leasing the defective
sailboat
After determining the current status
of the law regarding strict liability, the
Florida Supreme Court examined the
specific facts of the case at bar. The
court recognized that the Diplomat, a
hotel, would not normally be considered as engaging in the business of
renting sailboats. Nevertheless, because
the Diplomat leased part of its property
for the specific purpose of sailboat rental,
actively marketed the boats to its guests
as a part of the hotel's services, and led
guests to believe that they were renting
theirboats from the Diplomat, the hotel's
involvement in the sailboat rental business was sufficient to subject it to strict
liability as a commercial lessor. Further, the court found that the Amorosos
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were entitled to assume the boat they
rented was free from defects. Accordingly, the majority affirmed the district
court's holding that the Diplomat was
strictly liable for injuries to Mrs.
Amoroso resulting from defects in a
sailboat she rented from Atlantic. Thus,
the Florida Supreme Court extended the
application of strict liability to commercial lease transactions, subject to
the limitations set forth in the opinion.
Dissenting justices question strict
liability
Justices McDonald and Overton concurred in part and dissented in part with
the majority's opinion. The justices concurred with the majority's decision insofar as it held the Diplomat liable under the theories of implied warranty of
fitness and negligence, but disagreed
with the application of strict liability to
the Diplomat. They contended that strict
liability should not apply to the Diplomat because the sailboat rental business
was only an incidental part of the hotel's
business. Furthermore, the two justices
felt that the majority's application of
strict liability to the Diplomat was unnecessary because the theories of implied warranty of fitness and negligence
provide adequate protection to the public in such cases.
-Christy Thouvenot

Mailing, not receipt,
determines refund
time limitations
In Rosser v. United States, 9 F.2d
1519 (1 lth Cir. 1993), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11 th Circuit held that
the statute of limitations for a tax refund
claim expires two years from the mailing of a disallowance notice. Reversing
the district court, the 11th Circuit declared the plain language of 26 U.S.C.
§6532(a)(1) to mean that the statute of
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limitations for an income tax dispute
runs from the date a disallowance notice is mailed, regardless of whether the
taxpayer actually receives such notice.
The court further maintained that a second disallowance notice does not equitably estop the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from asserting the statute of
limitations as a bar to a taxpayer's recovery.
Taxpayer Claims Refunds for
Charity Deductions
Robert G. Rosser's federal income
tax returns for the years 1979 through
1982 claimed charitable deductions for
art objects he donated to the Birmingham Museum of Art. The IRS disallowed portions of those charitable deductions and, therefore, found deficiencies in Rosser's tax liability for those
years. On April 5, 1985, Rosser paid his
deficiencies for 1979, 1980, and 1981.
On December 30, 1986, Rosser paid his
deficiencies for 1982 and 1983.
On March 18, 1987, Rosser filed
timely refund claims for 1980 and 1981.
On April 1, 1987, Rosser filed refund
requests for 1979, 1982, and 1983. On
January 5, 1988, the IRS responded to
Rosser's refund claims by sending to
him via certified mail notices of disallowance for each of the years 1979
through 1983. Rosser denied receipt of
these notices and submitted an affidavit
attesting to his failure to receive them.
On December 30, 1988, Rosser
refiled his petitions for refunds for 1979
through 1983, contending that he had
not received the disallowance notices
from the IRS. The IRS responded by
mailing Rosser letters on January 17,
1989, which stated that it would look
into his 1982 and 1983 claims and answer him "more fully in 60 days." On
January 23, 1989, the IRS issued Rosser
a notice of disallowance for 1979, 1980,
and 1981. The notice explained that his
claims were not timely filed as required
by 26 U.S.C. Section 6511 and advised
Rosser to contact the IRS with questions.

On January 18, 1991, Rosser filed a
refund suit, arguing that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run upon
mailing of the initial notices of disallowance on January 5, 1988. Rosser
argued that the Section 6511 statute of
limitations should not begin to run until
the taxpayer actually receives the notice. Rosser contended that he reasonably relied on the January 17 and January 23, 1989, letters he received from
the IRS. In contrast, the IRS argued that
its letter mailed January 5, 1988, constituted adequate notice to begin the statute of limitations period, and that its
January 17, 1989, letter had no effect on
the limitations period.
The district court determined that
the statute of limitations did not bar
Rosser's suit, and pursuant to the parties' stipulation as to the relevant amount
in taxes, entered judgment in Rosser's
favor.
Eleventh Circuitrejects taxpayer's
argument that notice receipt is
required
On appeal, the IRS contended that
both the plain language of Section
6532(a)(1) and congressional intent
conflict with Rosser's interpretation of
the statute. Thus, the 11 th Circuit first
examined the language of Section
6532(a)(1) which states as follows:
[n]o suit or proceeding.. for the
recovery of any internal revenue
tax... shall be begun... after the
expiration of two years from the
date of mailing by certified mail
or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of
disallowance of the part of the
claim to which suit or proceeding
relates.
The court specifically noted that the
plain language of Section 6532(a)(1)
indicates that the statutory period begins to run from the date of the mailing,
irrespective of the taxpayer's receipt of
the notice.
The 11 th Circuit next scrutinized the
legislative history of Section 6532(a)(1),
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